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Free will is one of the fundamental aspects of human cognition. In the context of cognitive
neuroscience, various experiments on time perception, sensorimotor coordination, and
agency suggest the possibility that it is a robust illusion (a feeling independent of actual
causal relationship with actions) constructed by neural mechanisms. Humans are known
to suffer from various cognitive biases and failures, and the sense of free will might
be one of them. Here I report a positive correlation between the belief in free will and
paranormal beliefs (UFO, reincarnation, astrology, and psi). Web questionnaires involving
2076 subjects (978 males, 1087 females, and 11 other genders) were conducted, which
revealed significant positive correlations between belief in free will (theory and practice)
and paranormal beliefs. There was no significant correlation between belief in free will
and knowledge in paranormal phenomena. Paranormal belief scores for females were
significantly higher than those for males, with corresponding significant (albeit weaker)
difference in belief in free will. These results are consistent with the view that free will is
an illusion which shares common cognitive elements with paranormal beliefs.
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INTRODUCTION
The ability to choose one’s own action is one of the most salient
features of our daily experience. In the literature, the status and
nature of free will is still debated (Haggard, 2011; Smith, 2011).
Causal determinism is the fundamental assumption in the physi-
cal sciences, and provides an implicit framework for chemical and
biological sciences. The libertarian position on free will (Clarke,
2003) denies causal determinism, at least in humans and other
agents possessing free will. Taking the determinist position in its
strict sense, on the other hand, could lead to the negation of free
will. When considering the findings of modern and contempo-
rary sciences, the compatibility with causal determinism becomes
a fundamental constraint on the nature of free will. The concept
of free will, even when its existence is maintained, must somehow
be made compatible with causal determinism.
The exact nature of the compatibility of free will with causal
determinism is an open question (Van Inwagen, 1975; Kane, 1998,
2011). The compatibilist position on free will does not necessar-
ily assume that both causal determinism and free will are true.
However, the compatibilist position is commonly held to imply
the truth of some form of determinism and the possession of free
will (Fischer, 2009).
One of the possible ways to make free will compatible with
causal determinism is to assume that it is an “illusion,” which
implies that “the experience of consciously willing an action is
not a direct indication that the conscious thought has caused the
action” (Wegner, 2003). The notion that free will is an illusion dis-
sociated from actual causation is not new. Hume (1739) defined
human “will” as “nothing but the internal impression we feel and
are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion
of our body, or new perception of ourmind.” Here, I take the posi-
tion that free will is an illusion dissociated from actual causation,
although the relevance of data reported below are not necessarily
limited to this particular position.
Evidence suggests that the feeling that one has free will arises
as a result of coordinated activities of neural circuits in the brain.
The mere presence of action is not sufficient for a sense of free
will. When the motor cortex was stimulated directly during an
operation, the produced movements were not accompanied by a
sense of free will causing the action (Penfield, 1975). The posses-
sion of agency is an important element of free will. In the alien
hand syndrome (Goldstein, 1908; Banks et al., 1989), the subject
loses the sense of agency for the limb and feels that it has a “will
of its own.” In split-brain patients, the left brain (which is respon-
sible for verbal report) is unaware of the cause of actions induced
by communications to the right hemisphere (Gazzaniga, 1995),
resulting in the impairment of the reportable sense of free will.
The disruption of free will is a pathological condition affecting
the subject’s overall wellbeing. Patients with Schizophrenia suf-
fer from avolition, in which the patient experiences low drive and
lack of motivation to pursue goals (Andreasen, 1982; Messinger
et al., 2011). In the dissociative identity disorder (Reinders et al.,
2003; American Psychiatric Association, 2013), multiple person-
alities alternatingly take control, with compartmentalized knowl-
edge and memories, resulting in a loss of an integrated sense of
free will.
The disruption of a normal sense of free will can sometimes
involve more than one agent. It is known that the brain’s book-
keeping mechanism associated with agency sometimes misplaces
cause and effect, especially in a situation involving interactions
between individuals. For example, the facilitated communica-
tion is a controversial method in which the facilitator supports
the hand/arm of an impaired person, helping the individual to
communicate (Jacobson et al., 1995). It has been shown that the
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intentional origin of action can be misplaced, with the agency
of action attributed to a wrong person (Wegner and Wheatley,
1999; Wegner et al., 2003). Facilitated communication is not an
isolated case. The belief in external agents can lead to a belief
in bizarre dissociations of perceived authorship in such cases as
trance channeling and spirit possession (Wegner, 2002).
The integration of information regarding sensorimotor con-
tingency is an important element in the construction of the sense
of free will, in which time is an essential parameter. In normal
subjects, the conscious will to produce an action is perceived to
precede the actual initiation of action, while brain activities lead-
ing to the action physically occurs before the conscious realization
of the urge to move (Libet, 1985). Libet’s results have been inter-
preted to indicate that the decision to initiate action takes place
unconsciously before the conscious perception of it occurs, sug-
gesting that conscious processing is an epiphenomenon or at best
a vetoing mechanism.
Alternative interpretations of Libet’s scheme have been pro-
posed. Schurger et al. (2012) liken the neural decision of spon-
taneous action to “tipping over the first in a row of dominoes,”
setting into motion “a cascade that is ballistic, but not determin-
istic.” In this scheme, the premotor activities are characterized by
ongoing fluctuations, which contributes to the buildup for action
initiation through a leaky stochastic accumulator. The gradual 1-s
to 2-s increase in neural activities preceding spontaneous move-
ments are common to both vertebrates (Kornhuber and Deecke,
1965; Romo and Schultz, 1987) and invertebrates (Kagaya and
Takahata, 2010), suggesting the universality of such a process.
Miller and Schwarz (2014), citing the experiment of Matsuhashi
and Hallet (2008), argue for a graded model of conscious decision
making, as an alternative to Libet’s all-or-none model.
Summarizing the works reviewed thus far, the evidence is
compatible with the idea that free will is an illusion, with the
disruption of the related processes resulting in anomalies and
pathologies.
In a previous study, it was found that there was a significant
correlation between the subject’s sense of free will and paranor-
mal worldviews (Mogi, 2013). In contrast, there was no significant
correlation between paranormal beliefs and the subject’s views
on qualia, another essential element of phenomenal experience.
Thus, although free will and qualia are two salient features of con-
scious experience, their correlations with paranormal beliefs are
significantly different. Some authors argue that qualia are illu-
sions (e.g., Dennett, 1993). The difference in correlations with
paranormal beliefs suggests that qualia and free will are cogni-
tively different, even if both of them are indeed illusions. Studying
the correlations of the sense of free will with paranormal beliefs
in more detail would facilitate the clarification of the cognitive
factors involved.
Paranormal phenomena are defined as those that, if genuine,
would violate basic limiting principles of science (Broad, 1953).
It is difficult to maintain paranormal beliefs in a manner con-
sistent with the findings of contemporary sciences. However,
paranormal beliefs (e.g., UFOs, reincarnation, psychic powers,
and astrology) persist in society in spite of the best evidence
against them. Paranormal beliefs among the general population
are persistent according to the Gallup poll. In 1976, 17, 24, and
9% of people living in the USA believed in astrology, UFOs, and
reincarnation, respectively, whereas in 1997, the ratios of believers
were 37, 30, and 25%, respectively (cited in French and Wilson,
2007). The 2005 Gallup poll (http://www.gallup.com/poll/16915/
three-four-americans-believe-paranormal.aspx) found that 25%
of living in the USA believed in astrology, 20 % believed in
reincarnation, while 41% believed in ESP (extrasensory percep-
tion). Thus, beliefs in paranormal phenomena continue to be an
ingredient of folk psychology.
Some studies have suggested that there are gender differences
in paranormal beliefs. Specifically, female subjects show stronger
belief in paranormal phenomena (e.g., ESP and astrology) com-
pared to male subjects (Irwin, 1993; Rice, 2003). On the other
hand, previous studies on belief in free will (Viney et al., 1982;
Rakos et al., 2008) did not specifically investigate the gender
differences.
Misinterpreting or ignoring empirical evidence or acting on
wrong assumptions (e.g., choosing one’s action based on astrol-
ogy readings) can be maladaptive, since such strategies do not
have empirical or causal basis. It is thus an interesting question
why and how paranormal beliefs persist. Are paranormal beliefs
the result of ignorance? Do they represent the subject’s cogni-
tive biases? Cognitive biases can be adaptive in some contexts
(Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996). Given the rate of prevalence
among the general public, is it possible that paranormal beliefs
(and/or the cognitive tendencies correlating with them) are adap-
tive in some contexts?
Some studies have revealed brain processes correlated with
paranormal beliefs. Citing evidence for the effects of stimula-
tion and hallucinations caused by vascular anomalies, activities
in the temporal lobe have been suggested to correlate with reli-
gious and mystical experiences (Persinger, 1983). An EEG (elec-
troencephalogram) study revealed that believers in paranormal
phenomena showed relatively higher right hemispheric activation
and reduced hemispheric asymmetry of functional complexity
(Pizzagalli et al., 2000). Disruptions of multisensory information
integration from one’s own body at the temporo-parietal junction
(TPJ) have been suggested to correlate with out-of-body expe-
rience, an important element of some paranormal phenomena
(Blanke and Arzy, 2005).
Few studies have specifically looked at belief in free will and
paranormal beliefs in a common context, as they have been
considered separate. It is thus interesting to study how these ele-
ments of cognition are related, in view of the possible correlations
between the two.
Here I investigate the correlations between paranormal beliefs
and the sense of free will. Two aspects of belief in free will
were put to question. The first is the subject’s belief in the exis-
tence of free will as a theory. The second is the subject’s belief
in possessing free will in the practical executions of action in
their daily lives. Four elements of paranormal beliefs, i.e., rein-
carnation, astrology, UFO, and psi were investigated. These ele-
ments are based on the generally accepted paranormal belief scale
(Tobacyk and Milford, 1983; Tobacyk, 2004), in which seven-
point questionnaires were adopted as an appropriate method of
investigation. In addition, the subjects’ knowledge of paranormal
phenomena was investigated, to differentiate the correlations of
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paranormal beliefs and paranormal knowledge with the belief in
free will.
METHODS
The web-based questionnaire was conducted in Japanese.
Participation was accepted for 6 days, from 17:00 3rd December
2013, JST (Japan Standard Time) to 17:00 8th December 2013,
JST. The author’s twitter account (@kenichiromogi, with 522256
and 523956 followers at the beginning and end of web survey,
respectively) was used to recruit subjects for participation. The
advertising tweet introduced and called for participation in a
“survey on free will,” with the URL of the questionnaire. There
was no mention of paranormal beliefs at this stage. There were
nominally 2113 entries at the end of the survey period. When
checked for irregularities, 33 subjects were found to have made
entries twice, while two subjects made three entries. The multiple
entries were found to be consistent within a particular subject,
and were treated as single entry per subject for further analysis.
Seven subjects entered their age with Chinese characters (a com-
mon irregularity found in the Japanese webspace). These entries
were corrected into equivalent Arabic numerals. After filtering
and rectifying these irregularities, data for 2076 subjects (978
males, 1087 females, and 11 other genders, with age average of
37.5 and standard deviation of 11.3) were submitted to further
analysis.
The subjects were first asked two free will related questions.
Question 1: Do you agree with the statement “humans have free
will?” Question 2: Do you agree with the statement “in everyday
life, you are actually choosing your actions freely?” The subjects
answered questions 1 and 2 in 7-point scales (1: Not at all so,
2: Not so, 3: Slightly not so, 4: Neutral, 5: Slightly so, 6:So, 7:
Very much so). Question 1 and 2 were designed to assess the
subjects’ “theoretical” and “practical” beliefs in the existence of
free will, respectively. The belief in free will (theory) question
corresponded to “the Free Will and Determinism-General Will
Questions” in Rakos et al. (2008), which is comprised of 14 items
(e.g., “Free will is a basic part of human nature”), while the belief
in free will (practice) questions corresponded to the “Free Will
andDeterminism-PersonalWill Questions” in Rakos et al. (2008),
which is comprised of eight items (e.g., “I am in charge of the
decisions I make”).
After the free will questions, the subjects answered questions
regarding their belief in paranormal worldviews. In the question-
naire, no explanation was given as to the relevance of paranormal
questions to the question of free will. There were no contexts
suggesting any correlations between the belief in free will and
paranormal beliefs. The comments after the completion of the
questionnaire suggested that the subjects did not in general sus-
pect the nature of the relevance of paranormal belief questions in
a survey on free will. Indeed, some of the subjects expressed their
perplexity at being asked the paranormal questions.
There were four paranormal belief questions. Question 3: Do
you agree with the statement “reincarnation exists?” Question 4:
Do you agree with the statement “the divinations of astrology
are significant?” Question 5: Do you agree with the statement
“UFOs are flying to the earth, with aliens on them?” Question
6: Do you agree with the statement “psychic powers such as
precognition, clairvoyance, and psychokinesis exist?” The subject
answered these questions in 7-point scales (1: Not at all so, 2:
Not so, 3: Slightly not so, 4: Neutral, 5: Slightly so, 6: So, 7: Very
much so). The four themes covered in the paranormal belief ques-
tions are based on the generally accepted paranormal belief scale
(Tobacyk and Milford, 1983; Tobacyk, 2004), with the 7-point
scale questioning methodology.
The paranormal belief questions were followed by the corre-
sponding paranormal knowledge questions 7, 8, 9, 10 (Table 1),
in which the subjects answered the number of items that they
knew out of 10 presented. The knowledge items asked in these
questions were chosen to have global significance, while being
relevant to the Japanese populace. The subjects completed the
questionnaire by answering their age, gender (male, female, or
others) and indicating their informed consent in the understand-
ing that the entries would be statistically processed, to be used
in a scientific investigation without revealing the identities of the
participants.
METHODS: ETHICS STATEMENT
The experimental protocol was submitted to and approved by the
brain and cognitive sciences ethics committee of Sony Computer
Science Laboratories.
RESULTS
Two-tailed student’s t-tests were conducted to test significances.
The average theoretical and practical belief scores in free will were
5.25 and 4.38, respectively, with standard deviations of 1.56 and
1.57, respectively. The nominal score was significantly higher for
the theoretical belief compared to the practical belief (t = 17.9,
p = 6.9× 10−64). There was a significant correlation between
the theoretical and practical beliefs in free will (r = 0.529, t =
24.1, p = 2.90× 10−113). The average belief scores were 3.47,
3.19, 3.94, and 4.26 for reincarnation, astrology, UFO, and psi
respectively, with standard deviations of 2.07, 1.83, 1.85, and
1.81, respectively. The sum of the four belief scores (henceforth
referred to as the “paranormal belief score”) was calculated for
each subject and used for further analysis. The average of para-
normal belief score was 14.6, with a standard deviation of 5.9.
The average paranormal knowledge scores were 0.99, 0.95, 1.79,
and 2.65 for reincarnation, astrology, UFO, and psi respectively,
with standard deviations of 1.68, 1.81, 2.31, and 2.54, respec-
tively. The sum of the four knowledge scores (henceforth referred
to as the “paranormal knowledge score”) was calculated for each
subject and used for further analysis. The average of paranor-
mal knowledge score was 6.28, with a standard deviation of 6.68.
There was a significant correlation between paranormal belief
scores and paranormal knowledge scores (r = 0.223, t = 10.4,
p = 9.93× 10−25).
There were significant correlations between the paranormal
belief scores and the theoretical and practical beliefs in free will.
Taking the data of each subject as individual samples, the corre-
lation coefficient between the theoretical belief in free will and
paranormal belief score was 0.164 (t = 7.57, p = 5.58× 10−14),
while that between the practical belief in free will and paranor-
mal belief score was 0.123 (t = 5.64, p = 1.93× 10−8). Taking
the data for each subject as individual samples, there were no
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Table 2 | Correlations between belief in free will (theory/practive) and
paranormal belief/knowledge scores.
Paranormal belief
score
Paranormal knowledge
score
Belief in free will
(theory)
r = 0.164
(t = 7.57,
p = 5.58× 10−14)
n.s.
(t = 0.346, p = 0.729)
Belief in free will
(practice)
r = 0.123
(t = 5.64,
p = 1.93× 10−8)
n.s.
(t = 0.697, p = 0.486)
There were significant correlations of theoretical and practical belief in free will
with paranormal belief scores, with r = 0.164 (t = 7.57, p = 5.58 × 10−14) and
r = 0.123 (t = 5.64, p = 1.93 × 10−8), respectively. There were no significant
correlations of theoretical and practical belief in free with paranormal knowledge
scores, with t = 1.67, p = 0.108 and t = 0.182, p = 0.970, respectively.
FIGURE 1 | Average belief in free will for particular paranormal belief
scores. The scores for belief in free will (theory and practice) are average
and plotted for subjects with particular paranormal belief scores. The
possible range of scores for belief in free will was 1–7, while that for
paranormal belief was 4–28. Vertical bars represent standard errors of the
mean. The correlation coefficients between the paranormal belief score and
beliefs in free will (theory and practice) were 0.872 (t = 8.46, p = 1.62×
10−8) and 0.837 (t = 7.34, p = 1.86× 10−7), respectively.
significant correlations between paranormal knowledge scores
and the theoretical (t = 0.346, p = 0.729) or practical (t = 0.697,
p = 0.486) beliefs in free will. These results are summarized in
Table 2. The graph plotting the average free will belief scores
for subjects with particular paranormal belief scores reveal a
monotonously increasing relationship (Figure 1), with correla-
tion coefficients between the paranormal belief scores and beliefs
in free will of 0.872 (t = 8.46, p = 1.62× 10−8) and 0.837
(t = 7.34, p = 1.86× 10−7) for theoretical and practical beliefs,
respectively. The graph plotting the average free will belief scores
for subjects with particular paranormal knowledge scores reveal
a flat relationship (Figure 2). There were no significant correla-
tions between paranormal knowledge scores and the theoretical
(t = 1.67, p = 0.108) or practical (t = 0.182, p = 0.970) beliefs
in free will.
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FIGURE 2 | Average belief in free will for paranormal knowledge
scores. The scores for belief in free will (theory and practice) are averaged
and plotted for subjects with particular paranormal knowledge scores. The
possible range of scores for belief in free will was 1–7, while that for
paranormal knowledge was 0–40. Vertical bars represent standard errors of
the mean. There were no significant correlations between the paranormal
knowledge score and beliefs in free will [theory (t = 1.67, p = 0.108) and
practice (t = 0.182, p = 0.970)].
Gender comparison was conducted for males and females
only, as the number of “other genders” entries were too small
to arrive at statistically significant results (11 other genders in
comparison with 978 males and 1087 females). Analysis of data
revealed some significant differences between male and female
subjects. The average paranormal belief scores for males and
females were 12.9 and 16.6, respectively, with standard devi-
ations of 5.2 and 5.4, respectively (Figure 3A). The difference
of paranormal belief scores between the male and female sub-
jects was significant (t = 22.2, p = 5.03× 10−54). The average
paranormal knowledge scores for males and females were 6.49
and 6.23, respectively, with standard deviations of 6.62 and 6.66,
respectively (Figure 3B). The difference of paranormal knowl-
edge scores between male and female subjects was not significant
(t = 0.894, p = 0.371). The average beliefs in free will (theory)
were 5.18 and 5.32 for male and female subjects, respectively, with
standard deviations of 1.68 and 1.44, respectively (Figure 4A).
The difference between males and females was significant (t =
2.05, p = 0.040). The average belief scores in free will (prac-
tice) for males and females were 4.31 and 4.45, respectively, with
standard deviations of 1.62 and 1.52 (Figure 4B). The difference
between males and females was significant (t = 2.02, p = 0.044).
DISCUSSION
This study has addressed the relation between the subjects’ per-
ception of free will and paranormal beliefs. Themethod of present
study can only reveal correlations between cognitive tendencies
in a large number of subjects. The number of items asked in
this study as regards free will (theory and practice) was small
compared to the more extensive surveys on free will (e.g., Rakos
et al., 2008). These limitations should be taken into account when
interpreting the data reported here.
The method of recruiting subjects (through tweets of the
author) might have introduced some bias in the participant base.
By the nature of tweets of the authors account, the follower base
is likely to reflect a general interest in themes of neuroscience
and cognition. The followers, however, would not be necessarily
actively interested in paranormal views, as the author’s account
rarely touches on that particular theme. When calling for par-
ticipation in a survey on free will, the tweets did not mention
questions on paranormal beliefs. Thus, the significant correla-
tions between belief in free will and paranormal beliefs reported
here are not likely to be the result of the recruited subjects
specifically interested in paranormal phenomena.
The average belief score for free will in theory was nominally
significantly higher than that for in practice. However, the two
measures exhibited similar tendencies in relation to paranormal
belief and knowledge scores. There was a significant correlation
between the subjects’ assessment of free will and paranormal
belief scores. On the other hand, the correlation between belief
in free will and paranormal knowledge scores was not significant.
It is possible that the significant correlations between the sub-
jects’ assessment of free will and paranormal belief scores are the
result of some subjects having a general bias to give high “belief”
scores in the Lickert scale, but not high “knowledge” scores. If
such is the case, it is possible that the significant correlations
found here are not specifically between belief in free will and para-
normal belief scores. Analysis based on the present set of data
cannot exclude this possibility. On the other hand, the results of
Mogi (2013), which found no significant correlations between
the subjects’ evaluations of qualia and paranormal belief while
finding significant correlations between free will and paranormal
belief scores, are consistent with the interpretation that there is
indeed a specific correlation between free will and paranormal
belief.
Although there were significant correlations between belief in
free will (theory or practice) and paranormal belief scores, the
range of beliefs in free will was not necessarily large. The dif-
ferences between the highest and lowest average belief scores for
subjects with particular paranormal belief scores (Figure 1) were
1.92 and 1.57 in the Likert scale for the theoretical and practical
beliefs in free will, respectively. The practical significances (if any)
of the positive correlation between belief in free will and para-
normal belief scores should be considered in view of these actual
changes involved.
There were significant gender differences between male and
female subjects, with female subjects tending to have more para-
normal belief. This finding is consistent with previous research
(Irwin, 1993; Rice, 2003). Female subjects reported more belief
in free will compared to male subjects, albeit by a smaller margin
compared to that for paranormal beliefs.
In view of the positive correlation between belief in free will
and paranormal beliefs, it is interesting to consider the possible
adaptive or maladaptive values for subjects holding these beliefs.
Holding a paranormal belief seems to indicate a lack of critical
thinking, as evidence from modern and contemporary sciences
are generally against the existence of paranormal phenomena.
Believers in the paranormal were found to perform less well on
probability estimation tasks (Blackmore and Tros´cianko, 1985).
In an experiment of psychokinesis, the subjects had the ten-
dency to believe that their trials were successful, even when they
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FIGURE 3 | Gender difference in paranormal belief and knowledge
scores. (A) Paranormal belief scores for male and female subjects. The
average paranormal belief scores for males and females were 12.9 and 16.6,
respectively, with standard deviations of 5.2 and 5.4, respectively. Vertical
bars represent standard errors of the mean. The difference of paranormal
belief scores between the male and female subjects was significant
(t = 22.2, p = 5.03× 10−54). (B) Paranormal knowledge scores for male and
female subjects. The average paranormal knowledge scores for males and
females were 6.49 and 6.23, respectively, with standard deviations of 6.62
and 6.66, respectively. Vertical bars represent standard errors of the mean.
The difference of paranormal knowledge scores between the male and
female subjects was not significant (t = 0.894, p = 0.371).
FIGURE 4 | Gender difference in the belief in free will (theory and
practice). (A) Belief in free will (theory) for male and female subjects. The
average belief in free will (theory) were 5.18 and 5.32 for male and female
subjects, respectively, with standard deviations of 1.68 and 1.44, respectively.
Vertical bars represent standard errors of the mean. The difference between
males and females was significant (t = 2.05, p = 0.040). (B) Belief in free will
(practice) for male and female subjects. The average belief in free will
(practice) were 4.31 and 4.45, respectively, with standard deviations of 1.62
and 1.52. Vertical bars represent standard errors of the mean. The difference
between males and females was significant (t = 2.02, p = 0.044).
were statistically not different from chance (Benassi et al., 1979).
People often fall victim to the illusion of control, in which sub-
jects often confuse skill and luck (Langer, 1975). Henslin (1967)
found that when playing dice, people tended to throw softly when
they wanted low numbers, while throwing hard for high num-
bers. When subjects had the opportunity to bet before and after
the dices were thrown (but before the outcome was known),
the subjects placed larger bets when betting before rather than
after the toss (Strickland et al., 1966). Illusions of control are
likely to occur in settings characterized by personal involvement,
familiarity, foreknowledge of desired outcomes, and a focus on
success (Thompson, 1999). The illusion of free will also has social
impacts. The Dunning-Krueger effect describes a situation where
subjects tend to have overly favorable views of their abilities in
social and intellectual domains (Kruger and Dunning, 1999).
Believers in reincarnation sometimes claim that the good or
bad nature of deeds in one’s lifetime is reflected in the next life
after reincarnation. The “just world” hypothesis assumes that
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actions and outcomes must have the same valence (Lerner, 1980),
where the subjects expect, for example, that noble deeds are
rewarded accordingly, or that victims are partly to blame for
what they suffer, even when there are no such correlations from
objective points of view. The prevalence of such cognitive biases
might correlate with the persistence of paranormal beliefs (e.g.,
reincarnation).
If holding paranormal belief or belief in free will is correlated
with these cognitive biases and failures, why do they persist? If
free will and paranormal worldview are positively correlated, as
this study suggests, are there common themes to be considered as
regards the adaptive values of these illusions?
Jahoda (1958) identified five criteria of positive mental health:
Positive attitudes toward the self; the ability to grow, develop,
and self-actualize; autonomy; environmental mastery in work and
social relationships; and integration. Positive illusions have been
suggested to promote mental health in the context of Jahoha
(Taylor and Brown, 1988, 1994). Having positive illusions has
been tied to reports of happiness, with perception of self-esteem,
self-confidence, and sense of control (Freedman, 1978). Having
illusions in free will or paranormal phenomena might have been
adaptive in these contexts, even when they do not necessarily
reflect the reality accurately.
It has been suggested that as humans evolved, those who
believed in internal agency might have been more effective in
controlling their environment (Rakos, 2004). Keynes (1936) dis-
cussed the “animal spirits” behind human behavior, arguing that
humans decided to do something as the result of a spontaneous
urge to action rather than inaction. Having a sense of free will
would suggest that the subject is proactive, or at least not shy of
taking actions. Having paranormal worldviewsmight result in the
subject taking actions (e.g., based on astrological readings) even
when they are based on misconceptions. Illusions such as free
will and paranormal beliefs might have been adaptive in that they
made the subjects more proactive.
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